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TO KNOW OURSELVES:
EXPLORING THE SECRET LIFE OF
CANADIAN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP1
By H.W. ARTHURS*
In everyone's life (and in some lives more than others) there comes
a moment of self-assessment. In that moment, we embark upon an
occasionally satisfying, often disturbing, process of matching our aspi-
rations against our achievements. If we can muster sufficient candour
and clarity of vision, we can sense how far aspiration has outrun
achievement. In order to measure ourselves, however, we must first become
explicit about what we really deep-down hoped to accomplish, how we
came to set ourselves particular goals, and why it is that we failed to
reach them. Armed with this self-knowledge, we can opt for a fantasy
of what we yet may become or for frank acceptance of what we already
are, redouble our efforts or reduce our expectations, surge into our best
work or subside into comfortable competence.
As with each of us, so with our common enterprise of legal
scholarship: for the Canadian legal academic community, this is a moment
of self-assessment. These Symposium issues of the Osgoode Hall Law
Journal, in their own right an important attempt at self-assessment, were
prompted by the Report to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada of its Consultative Group on Research and Education
in Law, another such attempt. That Report, entitled Law and Learning,2
offered an extensive indictment. Canadian legal scholarship, it said, is
too monolithically committed to traditional analytical methods, too
preoccupied with an agenda of issues defined by professional priorities,
too deeply immersed in formal legal documentation, and too firmly impli-
cated in the value structures and mind-set of the practising bar and gov-
ernment law reform activities. This was not a new bill of particulars.
o Copyright, 1985, H.W. Arthurs.
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, and President, York University.
I have adopted this title by way of homage to the seminal Symons Report of the same
name (Report of the Commission on Canadian Studies, To Know Ourselves (Chair. T.H.B. Symons)
(1975)). The Symons Report was one of the important influences upon Law and Learning (Consultative
Group on Research and Education in Law, (1983)) and upon me as Chair of the Consultative
Group.
2 Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, ibid.
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Somewhat similar criticisms have been current at least since the 1950s,3
and have informed law review articles, faculty curriculum reports, and
common room conversation for the past. thirty or forty years. What
distinguished Law .and Learning, however, was the attempt to-document
empirically what had previously been an impressionistic assessment, and
to offer a factually-grounded explanation of the phenomenon.
In a study undertaken by Alice Janisch for the Consultative Group,4
considerable evidence was indeed generated to support the indictment.
Analysis of both the most recent publications, and publications sampled
at periodic intervals over the past twenty years, appeared to show that
even in what many believed (and wished) to be a period of radical advance
in legal scholarship, relatively little had changed. To be sure, the
methodology adopted in the Janisch study was not unimpeachable. In
defiance of the Consultative Group's own strictures (but constrained by
limited time and money), the study only included books in law library
collections and articles in legal periodicals. It thus understandably failed
to take account of some important work of scholars who published in
other types of journals, and of those whose work was thought to be
more suitably lodged in other types of libraries. Moreover, speculation
concerning the influences that shaped legal scholarship was based upon
another study of its principal producers, law professors.5 The failure of
the Consultative Group (again because of the constraints mentioned)
to conduct comparative studies of either practising lawyers or academics
in other disciplines makes its conclusions as to causes and effects
somewhat vulnerable.
The present Symposium extends the process of self-assessment in
several senses. It offers qualitative - rather than merely quantitative
- judgments about research and writing in particular fields of law; it
focusses especially upon the productive five-year period following that
examined in the Janisch study; and to some extent it encompasses writing
about law that would not have been included in that study.
It would not be surprising, therefore, to find that those who have
examined Canadian legal scholarship in the context of the present
Symposium have a rather different view of its condition and prospects.
But, as a matter of fact, the views of most contributors to this Symposium
do not differ greatly from those of the Consultative Group. Even some
who find Law and Learning's indictment "not proven" hesitate to make
3 See, eg., M. Cohen, "The Condition of Legal Education in Canada" (1950) 28 Can. Bar
Rev. 267 at 287; Committee on Legal Research, "Report" (Chair F.R. Scott) (1956) 34 Can.
Bar Rev. 999.
4 A. Janisch, Profile of Published Legal Research (1982).
5 J. McKennirey, Canadian Law Professors (1982).
[VOL. 23 No. 3
To Know Ourselves
an unequivocal finding of "not guilty."6 Notwithstanding this similarity
of views, there is some evidence that suggests that our collective
achievements - especially our recent achievements - may have been
somewhat understated. More importantly, in the Symposium contributions
- and because of them - there are signs and portents of a new beginning
for Canadian legal scholarship that has as its most important elements
the willingness to seek both self-knowledge and the existence of vehicles
expressly designed for that purpose. Will and way are both essential,
of course, if achievements are to move closer to aspirations. Let me
explain why I detect the presence of both in this Symposium, and in
other contemporaneous developments.
Until now, it has been possible to pick up almost any law review
article (or, although they are still rara avis, most scholarly books on
law) and to read it from beginning to end without ever once sensing
that the author had made a conscious and articulate decision to pursue
one theoretical or methodological approach to the subject rather than
another.7 This sense of inevitability, this apparent acquiescence in our
scholarly fate, is the result of a failure of imagination about ourselves
and our own potential. This failure manifests itself, as well, in the notorious
reluctance of legal scholars to engage in controversy involving direct
disagreement with other scholars or, except in rather respectful tones,
even with the judges or legislators whose handiwork we so obsessively
discuss. But if we reflect neither upon ourselves nor upon others, how
can we - why should we - develop, test, and refine explanatory
hypotheses or the deep theoretical assumptions from which such -hyp-
otheses proceed?
Fortunately, as the Symposium papers themselves show, this incurious
and uncritical attitude may now be dissipating. Moreover, the papers
also give evidence that we are now becoming aware of the unexploited
capacity within Canadian legal scholarship for very explicit articulation
6 M. Gold, "Constitutional Scholarship in Canada" (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall LJ. 495.
7 A recent review of two books by Profs. Waddams and Sharpe concludes by inviting the
authors of Law and Learning to "issue and publish clarifying statements" to the effect-that they
had no intention to "denigrate[] doctrinal and theoretical work" of the sort typified by the work
of Profs. Waddams and Sharpe. See T.A. Cromwell, "In the Matter of an Arbitration Between
the Union of Doctrinal and Theoretical Legal Scholars and the Consultative Group on Research
and Education in Law" (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall LJ. 761 at 771. As the Consultative Group and
its chair are functus officio, the moment for official "clarifying statements" has passed. However,
I am pleased to state for the record that there never was in the mind of at least one of the authors
any such intention: we believed, as the reviewer suggests, that "all forms of legal scholarship have
been undervalued and deserve encouragement" (ibid. at 770), while stressing the particular dearth
of what we called 'fundamental' legal research and the consequent impoverishment of all legal
scholarship. For an excellent analysis of the standards by which to evaluate doctrinal and theoretical
writing in its own terms, see N. Brooks, "New Directions in Canadian Tax Law Scholarship" (1985)
23 Osgoode Hall LJ. 441 at 446-47.
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of theories of law, for rigorous application of those theories to one's
own work and to the work of others, and for spirited controversy fueled
by theory and using theory as an instrument of conflict.
Nor does this revelation depend solely upon the evidence of this
volume of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal. A rather similar conclusion
might be drawn from perusal of recent issues of other leading legal
periodicals, of publishers' lists, and even of some of the studies prepared
for the Macdonald Commission.8 There are still more signs and portents:
the establishment of a Canadian Law and Society Association and its
learned journal; the funding of a major, multifaceted interdisciplinary
legal research initiative at the University of Toronto, of an important
law and computers project at the University of British Columbia, and
of research projects of lesser scope but similar ambition elsewhere; the
initiation by the Canadian Institute of Advanced Research of a major
and imaginative programme of legal research; and other evidence. Many
of these developments are very recent, and some are as yet mere statements
of future intention. It is too early to take their full measure. But the
essays in this Symposium are available and deserve close attention: they
take as primary data recent Canadian legal scholarship, display its
pertinent characteristics, deal with these critically, and project some overall
impression of the state of the art.
Most of the essayists attempt a taxonomic approach to legal
scholarship, borrowing from Law and Learning the. classificatory labels
of 'conventional', 'theoretical', 'law reform', and 'fundamental' research.
While this may seem rather unambitious, the taxonomic exercise does
have considerable potential significance in itself. Typification can obscure
subtle differences and generate unintended controversy, but it may also
constitute the first step on the road to clarification. For example, when
we pursue more closely the question of what we mean by 'conventional'
legal research, or why it is that 'fundamental' research differs from legal
'theory' which is imbricated in doctrinal analysis, we are asking questions
that can lead us backwards into a series of intellectual problems almost
infinite in their challenges and possibilities.
Some of the essays, however, demonstrate greater theoretical vir-
tuosity. For example, Dean Macdonald's account of civil law scholarship
in Quebec is obviously the first instalment of a major intellectual history
of the subject.9 Professor Gold's integrative accounts of current consti-
tutional scholarship, wherever and by whomsoever undertaken, properly
8 Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Developing Prospects for Canada, Challenges
and Choices (Chair. D. Macdonald) (1984).
9 R.A. Macdonald, "Understanding Civil-Law Scholarship in Quebec" (1985) 23 Osgoode
Hall L. J. 573.
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remind us of the arbitrariness of the disciplinary divisions adopted in
the Janisch study, and presumably of other typifications as well.,o The
unlikely purlieu of tax law provides the setting for a far-ranging,
integrative, and critical essay by Professor Brooks.,, And contributions
by Professors Boyle, Mossman, Lahey, and Salter, from the perspective
of feminist legal theory, provide a critical counterpoint to conventional
interpretations of the role and function, respectively, of criminal,,2
property,,3 and corporation law.,,
Mention of the feminist contributions reminds us that there is more
involved in these essays than a bloodless attempt to define Canadian
legal scholarship in terms of its theoretical rigour or lack thereof. The
essays also proceed from ideological premises. Professors Mossman,
Boyle, Lahey, and Salter all argue (albeit with varying degrees of
explicitness) that law is ideology, used to justify or conceal the advance-
ment of some interests to the prejudice of others. The 'decoding' of law,
the exposure of its assumptions, and the demonstration of how these
contribute to its effects, is not, of course, a feminist project alone. This
approach is brilliantly sketched by Professor Brooks in a mini-essay on
"Economic Justice and the Role of Values in Tax Scholarship." However,
it is unfortunate that the Symposium does not include a fully developed
theoretical critique of Canadian legal scholarship from the perspective
of the Critical Legal Studies movement,,5 and indeed that its ideological
antithesis, the law and economics movement, is but glimpsed through
a glass and darkly16
10 Supra, note 6.
11 N. Brooks, supra, note 7.
12 C. Boyle, "Criminal Law and Procedure: Who Needs Tenure?" (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall
LJ. 427.
,3 MJ. Mossman, "Toward 'New Property' and 'New Scholarship': An Assessment of Canadian
Property Scholarship" (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall Li. 633.
14 K.A. Lahey & S.W. Salter, "Corporate Law in Legal Theory and Legal Scholarship: From
Classicism to Feminism" (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall L. 543.
1S Prof. Gold, supra, note 6, at footnote 46, makes reference to one of the few examples
of the Critical Legal Studies perspectives in Canadian public law scholarship; Prof. Lahey, "'...-
Until Women Themselves Have Told All They Have To Tell ... ' (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall LJ.
519, in developing the notion of a feminist jurisprudence, refers extensively - and with qualified
praise - to the American Critical Legal Studies literature; and as Prof. Brooks demonstrates in
his own article, supra, note 7, and through the pages of Canadian Taxation, of which he is the
founding editor, he too is well acquainted with this legal-political perspective. The absence of an
organized Canadian Critical Legal Studies movement (when such movements exist in Europe, the
United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States) in itself raises interesting questions about legal
scholarship in this country.
16 See K.A. Lahey and S.W. Salter, supra, note 14, at footnotes 66-70 and accompanying
1985l
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On the other hand, this search for the ideological significance of
law does not itself escape criticism. Professor Parker remarks, in a
Whiggish contribution characterised, however, by modest humanism: "The
legal scholar will not make great intellectual breakthroughs by having
epochal thoughts about political philosophy."17 This puts the issue squarely.
How or whether Canadian public law scholars are going to make "great
intellectual breakthroughs" without -thinking "epochally" or otherwise
about political philosophy is by no means clear. Nor is it clear that we
can afford to eschew "breakthroughs" in this Charter-inspired second
adolescence of our constitutional development. Such thinking was hardly
in evidence during the protracted debates over the entrenchment of the
Charter. To the limited extent that Canadian legal academics contributed
to the entrenchment debates, they spoke primarily to technical issues
- the wording of the protections to be gained; the formula for striking
a balance between the claims of the state and those of its constituent
groups and individuals; and the way in which the courts handled the
litigation that the protagonists launched for tactical gains. Even Professor
Gold, generally temperate in his critique of our constitutional law
scholarship, hesitates to identify any major theoretically-grounded con-
tributions to the entrenchment debate, and qualifies his praise for several
such contributions post-entrenchment with the observation that much
of the recent legal writing is highly expository and somewhat pedestrian
in ambition and execution.,8
Whether the course of Canada's constitutional history hinged solely
upon the philosophical taciturnity of its legal academics is doubtful. But
we can at least say that public debate over a radical change in our
politico-legal culture was impoverished by the absence of "epochal"
contributions from those who might have been thought most likely to
inform and stimulate it - our law professors. As we move towards further
and possibly more important changes - such as the legislative dismantling
of long-standing regulatory policies and institutions and the negotiation
of a new trading relationship with the United States - we can only
hope -that academic lawyers will contribute more than technical com-
mentary, ex post facto analysis, and uncontroverisial narrative.
How can we explain the limited participation of our legal sholars
in events that may well change the fundamental nature of our public
institutions, public policies, and public law?
17 G. Parker, "Legal Scholarship and Legal Education" (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall L.J. 653.
18 Supra, note 6 at 509. Perhaps Prof. Parker would applaud this body of work for the very
reason that Prof. Gold disparages it.
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Law and Learning offered several hypotheses that warrant only the
merest mention in this context: the pervasive professional preoccupations
of our law faculties; the limited exposure of our academics-in-training
to scholarly traditions and scholarly activity; our Canadian dependency
upon foreign graduate schools and legal theorists; and the diseconomies
of small scale in a scholarly community spread across two languages
and legal cultures, ten jurisdictions, and 3,000 miles. Elements of this
analysis reappear in several of the Symposium essays.,9 But if the analysis
is sound, how can we explain the formidable achievement of the
Symposium itself, and the other recent important developments referred
to earlier?
Surely the lesson of the Symposium is that concerted and focussed
effort to elicit reflective and self-critical scholarship is more likely to
bear fruit than individual and uncoordinated effort. The same can be
said of the research programmes and organizational and publishing
activities that form part of the recent encouraging developments that
escaped detection by the Law and Learning study (or that have transpired
since). If the editors of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal had not taken
the initiative in convening a Symposium on Canadian legal scholarship,
and in publishing a number of the contributions to it, how many of these
papers would have seen the light of day? If the new Canadian Law
and Society Association and its journal had not been created, what
opportunities and incentives would exist for aspiring socio-legal scholars
to pursue their chosen intellectual priorities? And if integrated and
interactive research programmes were not sponsored by universities and
other agencies, would individual scholars somehow still find the means
to attempt research into large and open-ended themes, and above all
to pursue serious theoretical questions of interest to fellow specialists?
In short, if Law and Learning indeed failed to describe developments
in Canadian legal scholarship with complete accuracy or prescience, its
19 Eg., J.E. Clayton and D.M. McRae, "International Legal Scholarship in Canada" (1985)
23 Osgoode Hall Li. 477 at 486, observe that "[flew, if any, Canadian academics have been
able to devote their careers to international law ... [and] ... [i]ncentives for research in international
law are limited." J. McLaren, "The Theoretical and Policy Challenges In Canadian Compensation
Law" (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall Li. 609 at 613, attributes the limited achievement of our torts
scholars (who, unlike international law scholars, are relatively numerous) in part to "the relative
immaturity of academic legal education and scholarship in Canada." Mi. Mossman, supra, note
13, at 635, suggests that the multiplicity of jurisdictions and the variety of juridical sources which
must be considered in any analysis ofCanadian property law "may provide at least a partial explanation
for the absence of property scholarship that advances beyond explication . 0..." G  Parker, supra,
note 17, at 662, argues that "... the whole question of a 'scholarly' approach to the law is dependent
on the need to protect Canadian legal culture," and "find[s] it very sad that young scholars in
Canada are so insensitive to the local cultural scene that they are prepared to embrace any ideas
that are spawned in Cambridge, Mass. without giving much thought to their application to the
Canadian situation."
1985]
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prescriptions would nonetheless seem to be valid. Law and Learning
placed great stress upon the need to extricate the academic enterprise
from the all-encompassing professional milieu in which it usually struggles
to survive. As a quintessential academic enterprise, the project of typifying,
evaluating, and theorizing about legal scholarship can only be carried
on with seriousness and intensity when it is recognized as having the
need for its own context, its own rhythm, its own standards, and its
own readership. That is why so little work of this type has appeared
previously. And that is why Law and Learning proposes that we establish
new structures to stimulate and sustain it on an ongoing basis.
Context is not all; structure is not all; distance from professional
values and activities is not all. But, as Law and Learning suggests, without
context, without structure, without distance we cannot release the latent
capabilities and energies which may -just may - invigorate Canadian
legal scholarship in its next stimulating phase.
